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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a fair trial is central to the American concept of justice.' To
ensure that a jury is capable of making a just decision, evidence must be pro-
duced by both sides in a trial. When evidence is destroyed or altered, this is
known as "spoliation" of evidence.2 Such spoliation may leave the trial record
incomplete, may impact the apparent relevancy of other evidence, and may in-
crease litigation costs as litigants scramble to "reconstruct the spoliated evidence
or to develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or
both."3 Courts have responded to this unfair practice by developing several pre-
ventative remedies.4
Recently, a few jurisdictions have adopted an independent tort for the
spoliation of evidence. Over twenty-six jurisdictions 5 have addressed the issue
and, of these, six have recognized the tort for negligent spoliation of evidence,6
I See Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its Independent Tort for
the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346 (1999) (citing Boldt v. Sanders, IIl
N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1961) ("It is essential to the achievement of justice that all of the
admissible evidence be brought .. for trial or settlement with full knowledge of the facts.");
Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the De-
struction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1138 (1987) ("Destruction of evidence undermines
two important goals of the judicial system--truth and fairness.")).
2 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 1999). The word's etymology derives from
British ecclesiastical courts. See id. ("The wrongful deprivation of a cleric of his benefice.").
Some courts have used the term 'spoilation' in its stead; however, the terms are interchange-
able. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986); La Raia
v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286, 287 (Ariz. 1986).
3 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 515 (Cal. 1998).
4 See Philip A. Lionberger, Comment, Interference with Prospective Civil Litigation by
Spoliation of Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a New Tort?, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 210 (1989)
(listing as potential remedies criminal sanctions, civil discovery sanctions, and the spoliation
inference); Bart S. Wilhoit, Comment, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging
Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 651-52 (1998) (discussing attorney discipline as an additional
remedy).
5 See Rubin, supra note I, at 353; Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation:
Common-Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 441, 450 (sorting out the
types of the spoliation tort recognized in each jurisdiction that has adopted one).
6 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 345, 353 (citing Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169
Cal. App. 3d 874 (1985); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998); Bondu v.
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d
11, 19 (Mont. 1999); Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d 1014 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div.
1997); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993)).
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while seven have recognized the tort in situations of intentional spoliation, 7 al-
though this is complicated by the fact that different courts use different termi-
8nology to define and address the same spoliation issues. Attempts to come up
with new remedies like these may be warranted, as a recent study has indicated
that fifty percent of litigators find spoliation to be a recurring problem.9 How-
ever, most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have not adopted the tort,
holding either that spoliation is better remedied by existing case law,10 or that
the court might recognize such a tort, but that it would be inapplicable under the
facts of the matter before the court at the time.ll It has been said of courts of the
latter variety that "[c]ourts appear eager to recognize the tort but reluctant to
apply it.'
12
Further damaging the tort's quest for acceptance, there appears to be a
trend away from acceptance of the tort among jurisdictions, at least when such a
7 See id. at 353-54 (citing Hazen, 718 P.2d 456; Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d 511; St. Mary's
Hosp., Inc., v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185
(N.M. 1995); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993)); Oliver, 993
P.2d at 19.
8 See Judge, supra note 5, at 450.
9 See MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE xiii-xiv (2000) (citing
Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of its Effectiveness, its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829 (finding evasive practices pervasive); Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial Discovery Misconduct:
Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Oppo-
nent's Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 794 (1993) (finding obstruction common); Charles R.
Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial
Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 795 (1991) (finding much incentive to spoliate, as such spo-
liation is unlikely to be discovered)).
10 See Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 n.2 (Ala. 2000) (citing Wilson v. Beloit Corp.,
921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Arkansas law); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F.
Supp. 966 (W.D. La. 1992) (applying Louisiana law); La Raia, 722 P.2d 286 (1986); Gardner v.
Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d
1312 (111. App. Ct. 1986); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Koplin
v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987); Miller v. Montgomery County, 494
A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 498 A.2d 1185 (1985); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods.
Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., Inc., 863 S.W.2d
905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1993);
Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App. 1993)); Med. Billing, Inc. v. Med. Mgmt. Scis.,
Inc., 169 F.R.D. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (commenting that the tort has not been "widely em-
braced").
1 See, e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d
434, 435, 439 (Minn. 1990).
12 James F. Thompson, Comment, Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37 U.
KAN. L. REV. 563, 589 (1989).
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claim is brought against an adverse party to the original suit.' 3 Many of these
courts have chosen to rely on court-enforced sanctions rather than adopt a new
tort.' 4 If there is any trend towards adoption of a spoliation tort, it is in respect to
spoliation claims against a third party, unrelated to the original suit.' 5 Since
1998, at least three courts have recognized the validity of such a claim.'
6
Most states that have adopted the tort have agreed that intentional spo-
liation of evidence consists of the following elements: 17 (1) pending or probable
civil litigation, (2) knowledge of the spoliator that the litigation is pending or
probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence, (4) intent of the spoliator to inter-
fere with the victim's prospective civil suit, 18 (5) a causal relationship between
the evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit, and (6) damages.' 9 A minor-
13 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 64-66 (citing several cases).
14 See id. at 65-66. For a description of court sanctions, see infra Part III.
15 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 66.
16 See, e.g., Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co.,
993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998).
17 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 644 (discussing basic elements of intentional spoliation tort and
citing Foster v. Lawrence Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Kan. 1992); Viviano v.
CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,
905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038
(Ohio 1993)).
18 There is some disagreement as to what level of culpability constitutes "intent." For
example, in Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993), the
court found intent to destroy evidence, even though the evidence had not shown destruction
"with a view toward precluding examination." Id. at 1130. In justifying itself, the court stated
that "[flor the destruction of evidence to be intentional, it need not rise to the level of a mali-
cious or 'evil minded act."' Id. at 1129-30. A contrasting view can be found in Headley v.
Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991). In Headley, the court required a find-
ing that the evidence was destroyed by a party's agent after he received notice that the evidence
would be needed for evidentiary purposes. Id. at 364 n. 1.
19 There is typically an issue in spoliation cases as to whether the missing evidence disrupts
the ability to calculate the amount of damages, as opposed to disrupting the ability to discern
the existence of damages. Both are often speculative, but should be considered separately. See
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). The Court
stated,
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there
was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between
the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sus-
tained some damage and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury
to fix the amount. The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain dam-
ages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those
damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in
respect to their amount.
Id. See also Thompson, supra note 12, at 589-90 ("[T]he mere absence of specific items of
destroyed evidence does not necessarily mean that success would have been possible with the
[Vol. 104
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ity of jurisdictions that have adopted a tort for intentional spoliation of evidence
have also added a duty element for intentional spoliation.2° Otherwise, there is a
homogeneity to the tort's elements.
Negligent spoliation of evidence is a very similar tort, differing only in
the elements of intent and, usually, duty. The elements of negligent spoliation
are set out in Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman,21 and there are six: (1) the
existence of a potential civil action, (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve
evidence that is relevant to the potential civil action,23 (3) destruction of the evi-
dence, (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit, (5) a causal
relationship between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the law-
suit, and (6) resulting damages. Most jurisdictions that recognize negligent spo-
liation of evidence have accepted this definition of the tort.24
Thus far, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has refused to
address the issue of whether it would recognize a claim in tort for either inten-
tional or negligent spoliation of evidence.25 This Note will attempt to address the
issue of whether West Virginia should adopt such a tort in any (or all) of its
forms. Part II will examine the common law origins of the tort and discuss its
evolution through the various jurisdictions that have adopted it. Part III will
discuss the various alternative remedial measures available to the court system
in general when instances of spoliation of evidence occur. Part IV takes a closer
look at both intentional and negligent spoliation claims, and will further subdi-
vide the two causes of action into: (1) claims against a party to the litigation, and
(2) claims against a third party unrelated to the litigation. It will then test these
subdivisions to determine whether they are needed in light of the alternative
remedies laid out in Part III. In light of this analysis, along with looking at sev-
evidence ... ").
20 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Cal. 1998) ("A tort,
whether intentional or negligent, involves a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute, con-
tract[,] or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured"); Wilhoit, supra note 4, at
644 (citing Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987) (stating
that the duty to preserve evidence can arise out of a special relationship, contract or agreement,
or other form of voluntary assumption of a duty)).
21 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 644 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
22 Note the slight difference in wording between the first element of intentional spoliation
and the first element for negligent spoliation. However, as of yet, there has been no difference
in application of the terms in any court, regardless of any (potentially) semantic difference.
23 See supra note 20; notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
24 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 644 (citing Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
25 See Tracy v. Cottrell ex. rel. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 887 (W. Va. 1999); Adkins v. K-
Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840, 847 (W. Va. 1998); Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104, 117 (W.
Va. 1996); Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270, 271 (W. Va. 1991).
2002]
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eral policy considerations and West Virginia case law, Part V recommends that
West Virginia only adopt a claim in tort for intentional spoliation by a third
party.
H. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
Although spoliation of evidence seems to be a recent addition to legal
terminology, the idea of preservation of evidence has been important to courts
for centuries.26 Since the classic 1722 property case of Armory v. Delamirie,27
courts have been trying to curb destruction of evidence.28 Armory introduced the
"spoliation inference, 29 which caused the court to assume that missing evidence
was of the highest value possible.3°
Since Armory, the legal system has developed several similar remedies
to combat spoliation. Most recently, in the 1984 products liability case of Smith
v. Superior Court, California became the first state to recognize an independent
cause of action in tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. 31 The court held
that the then-current remedies would neither compensate the party wronged by
the spoliation, 32 nor would they deter spoliators, as destruction of evidence was
only a misdemeanor in California.33 The court was troubled by the potential
difficulty in determining the measure of damages in a situation where the dam-
ages are inherently speculative, but noted that when the nature of the claim in-
herently precluded precision in determining damages, then only a "reasonable"
level of certainty should be required to be shown.34 As a final justification for its
26 In fact, the term "spoliation" comes from the Latin: omnia praesumuntur contra spolia-
torem, or "all things are presumed against the destroyer or wrongdoer." See generally Wilhoit,
supra note 4, at 637 (citing Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend
Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37 (1993)).
27 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
28 In Armory, a chimney sweep gave a jewel that he had found to a jeweler to be appraised.
The jeweler returned the setting to the boy, but had removed the stone. At trial, the jeweler
asserted that the stone had been misplaced, and the court held that if the jeweler would not
proffer the stone, then (because it would be impossible to determine the stone's value) the jury
could presume it to be of the highest value possible for its size. Id.
29 See Part III.A. infra and accompanying notes.
30 See Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
31 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998).
32 See id. at 834.
33 See id. The obstruction-of-justice statute in West Virginia, which is also applicable in
situations of intentional spoliation of evidence, is a misdemeanor, as well. See Thompson, su-
pra note 12, at 570 (citing W. VA. CODE § 61-5-27 (1989)).
34 See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. As authority, the court cited Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) ("Where the tort
[Vol. 104
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actions, the court analogized claims for intentional interference with prospective
business advantage to the burgeoning tort.35 The court followed this comparison
by stating that both causes of action would reimburse victims for probable ex-
pectancies, which make up "a large part of what is most valuable in modem
life., 36 The court reasoned that this importance should cause courts to do more
to "discover, define, and protect [these expectancies] from undue interfer-
ence."
37
A few months after the Smith decision, in Bondu v. Gurvich, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, was the first court to recognize
an independent tort for the negligent spoliation of evidence.38 In Bondu, the
court relied on Smith, as well as the prior California case of Williams v. Califor-
nia,39 and made a somewhat tenuous leap in logic to conclude that
[i]f, as in Williams and Smith, an action for failure to preserve
evidence or destruction of evidence lies against a party who has
no connection to the lost prospective litigation, then, a fortiori,
an action should lie against a defendant which, as here, stands
to benefit by the fact that the prospect of successful litigation
itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with cer-
tainty, it would be a perversion of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages
may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the
extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only
approximate.").
35 The elements for intentional interference with prospective business advantage are: 1) An
economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third person containing the probability of
future economic benefit to the plaintiff; 2) knowledge by the defendant of the existence of the
relationship; 3) intentional acts on the part of defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; 4)
disruption of the relationship; and 5) damages proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (citing Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal.
1975); Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (Ct. App. 1982)), overruled by Cedars-
Sinai, 954 P.2d at 521. It should be noted that California is the only state to recognize such a
cause of action. See Judge, supra note 5, at 455. Also, the analogy is not a particularly good
one, as in prospective economic advantage cases, there is almost always a contract that has
either been signed or was almost fully negotiated. Therefore, there is a basis for at least a rea-
sonable ascertainment of injury and damages. Id. Finally, this analogy was explicitly deemed a
mistake by the Supreme Court of California in Temple Comm. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976
P.2d 223, 231 (Cal. 1999).
36 Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 130, at 950 (4th ed. 1971)).
37 Id.
38 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1986).
39 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
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against it has disappeared along with the crucial evidence. 40
Interestingly enough, the Bondu court chose to analyze the claim under
the elements of simple negligence, rather than delineating any distinctive ele-
ments for a new cause of action.4 1 Bondu further explained that a claim for neg-
ligent spoliation of evidence may only stand if there is a requisite duty owed by
the spoliator to the plaintiff to preserve the evidence, and that the defendant
hospital was bound by such a duty by Florida statute in the instant matter.42 And
so the claim for negligent spoliation of evidence was born.
In the fifteen years since Smith, a handful of states have joined Califor-
nia in adopting an independent tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. 43 It
must have come as a shock to the courts of these states when California, birth-
place of the tort for intentional spoliation, overruled Smith to an extent and
scaled back the tort in the case of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior
Court.44 The court explicitly disapproved of Smith to the extent that it allowed a
cause of action against a party to the predominant claim in situations where the
victim of the spoliation knew, or should have known, of the alleged spoliation
prior to the trial or other decision on the merits.45 The court concluded its limit-
ing opinion by refusing to recognize whether there was a cause of action in tort
for intentional spoliation of evidence against a nonparty ("third party") to the
suit, or whether one existed where the victim did not know, or had no reason to
know, of the spoliation prior to a decision on the merits.
46
The Cedars-Sinai court justified its decision by discussing the tort's
lack of necessity in light of the remedies already available to courts to combat
spoliation.47 The court further stated that these remedies seem to have some
merit as deterrents because there did not appear to be a rampant problem with
40 Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312. For an explanation of how the two situations, in fact, may
differ see infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
41 The court apparently adopted the new tort for intentional spoliation of evidence using the
traditional elements for negligence: "(1) the existence of a duty recognized by law requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others including the
plaintiff; (2) a failure on the part of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) an injury or
damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by such failure." Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312.
42 See Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312. Bondu involved a hospital that lost the plaintiffs anesthe-
sia records and was subsequently unable to provide them to the plaintiff on his request. Id. at
1312-13.
43 See supra note 7.
44 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
45 See id. at 521.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 517-18. See also infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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spoliation within the justice system.48 Additionally, the court stated its belief
that trial is the time when the opportunity arises for litigants to search out and
reveal truth, and that propagation of such a tort would increase litigation, as well
as possibly bringing about violations of collateral estoppel and resjudicata.49
One year later, the Supreme Court of California cut back the viability of
a spoliation tort even further, eliminating the possibility of recourse in tort for
intentional spoliation by third parties. 50 The court relied largely upon its deci-
sion in Cedars-Sinai, basing its decision on fears of endless litigation, and refer-
ring to a "spiral of litigation giving rise to verdicts based on speculation.
' 51
Also, the court believed it would be anomalous for victims of spoliation to be
able to collect great sums of money from third party spoliators, while being
barred from doing so from adverse party spoliators, as a result of the existence
of alternate remedies against adverse parties who spoliate.52
The court was badly split however, with the author of the majority opin-
ion of Cedars-Sinai penning the dissent of the 4-3 decision.53 Justice Kennard
and his co-dissenters would "recognize a narrowly drawn tort remedy for the
intentional destruction of evidence by someone not a party to the underlying
cause of action to which the evidence is relevant, when the evidence is de-
stroyed with the intent of affecting the outcome of the underlying action., 54 Jus-
tice Kennard disagreed that the opinion he penned in Cedars-Sinai was analo-
gous to the instant matter, stating that non-tort remedies in instances of third
party spoliation are much more limited than in adverse party spoliation.55 Ken-
nard noted that non-tort remedies for third party spoliation do not help compen-
sate victims in the same manner as adverse non-tort spoliation remedies attempt
to do.56 Also, Justice Kennard made a strong argument that permitting a tort
against third party spoliatiors would not interfere with the finality of judg-
48 See Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518.
49 Id. at 515-17.
50 Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 225 (Cal. 1999). It should be noted
that the lower courts of California have followed the reasoning put forth in Temple to eliminate
the tort for negligent spoliation by a third party, as well. Therefore, all variations of the tort
may be truly dead in California. See, e.g., Coprich v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 890
(Ct. App. 2000); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 52 (Ct. App. 2000).
51 Temple, 976 P.2d at 225. The Court basically seemed to fear that juries would be forced
to grasp more and more tenuously for justice, founding their decisions on evidence that is just
as absent as it was during the first trial.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 234.
54 Id. at 235 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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ments.57 He reasoned:
[T]he spoliator has not litigated with the spoliation victim any
issue relating to [the spoliated] evidence or to the underlying
cause of action. Any judgment against the third party spoliator
would not alter the previous determination of liability between
the spoliation victim and the spoliation victim's opponent in the
underlying action.58
Regardless, there is now no cause of action in California for intentional spolia-
tion by a third party.
I. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
A. Spoliation Inference
State and federal courts have developed several measures for dealing
with spoliation that may render an independent cause of action for spoliation
unnecessary. 59 The most traditional remedy for spoliation is the spoliation infer-
ence or presumption. 6° When evidence is missing, the spoliation inference al-
lows the jury to presume that such evidence would have been unfavorable to the
spoliator.6 ' The inference shifts the burden of proof to the spoliator to show that
the evidence was not unfavorable to him,62 which typically requires some sort of
reasonable explanation for the unavailability of the evidence. 63 Courts are split
in determining when the spoliation inference is appropriate, with the culpability
of the spoliator being the point of contention. 64 Also, an inference is unlikely if
57 See id. at 237
58 Id.
59 These remedies include: 1) the spoliation inference, 2) discovery sanctions, 3) criminal
sanctions, and 4) attorney discipline. SeePart III infra and accompanying notes.
60 See, e.g., Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 647 (citing Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664,
664 (discussed supra note 28 and accompanying text)). The spoliation inference has been used
as the basis for denial of the recognition of a spoliation tort in Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control,
165 F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1999); Temple, 976 P.2d 223; and Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950
(Tex. 1998).
61 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 647 n. 113 (quoting Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd.,
633 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (La. Ct. App. 1994) ("The party is said to have admitted the adverse
nature of the evidence by his or her conduct.")).
62 See id. at 648 (citing Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La.
1992)).
63 See id. (citing Brown v. Hamid, 856 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. 1993)).
64 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 37 (citing as examples requiring intent: Bashier v. Amtrak,
119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997) ("mere negligence ... does not sustain an inference of
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the spoliator can show that the lost evidence was of little value.65 In determining
whether to apply the inference, courts generally use a four-factor test: "(1) an act
of destruction; (2) discoverability of the evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the
evidence; and (4) occurrence of the act at a time after suit has been filed, or, if
before filing, at a time when the filing is fairly perceived as imminent." 66
The spoliation inference is not a perfect remedy. Generally, plaintiffs
need supporting evidence because they must still prove every element of the
claim in order to recover, even in instances where spoliation has occurred.67 One
commentator has also stated that the inference is not precise enough to handle
the variety of procedural fairness issues that arise when spoliation becomes an
issue.68 Instances of negligent spoliation are rarely punished by the inference,
with courts desiring a showing of intent to spoliate in order to mandate such
punishment. 69 Finally, the inference is useless against third parties uninvolved in
the suit.
70
consciousness of a weak case"); Allen Pen Co., Inc. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., Inc., 653
F.2d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1981) (disallowing spoliation instruction when destruction was not in
bad faith); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996) (intent required for
inference); Battocchi v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 581 A.2d 759, 765-66 (D.C. 1990) (permitting
instruction for intentional or reckless spoliation, as well as for failure to preserve evidence
within a party's exclusive control even lacking such conduct); Cherovsky v. St. Luke's Hosp. of
Cleveland, No. 68326, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5530, at *23-24 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1995)
(instruction improper absent intentional, or at least reckless, conduct)). Examples in which
negligence is sufficient include Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Surely a finding of bad faith will suffice [to support an adverse inference], but so will simple
notice of potential relevance to litigation.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distrib., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1982)
(bad faith not necessary to establish inference); Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1291-92
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (bad faith not necessary to establish inference); Sullivan v. General Motors
Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358, 364 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (no instruction that plaintiff's failure to photo-
graph the defective part prior to repair was either negligent or in bad faith); Hamann v. Ridge
Tool Co., 539 N.W.2d 753, 756-57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (exclusion of expert testimony justi-
fied even where evidence was lost unintentionally)).
65 See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 2.5, at 36-37 (1989).
66 Id. §§ 3.8-3.12, at 88-109.
67 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 648 (citing Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 633 So. 2d
1357, 1361 (La. Ct. App. 1994)).
68 Judge, supra note 5, at 445.
69 See id. (citing Beers, 675 A.2d at 832 (citing jurisdictions)). However, Judge notes a split
among federal courts over this issue. Judge, supra note 5, at 445, n.34. Judge feels that the use
of the inference should be expanded to also include instances of negligent spoliation, on the
grounds that the inference restores accuracy and fairness to trials, and that the spoliator's level
of intent is irrelevant to trial. Useful evidence has been rendered powerless, regardless of intent.
See id. at 464-65.
70 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
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B. Discovery Sanctions
The discovery sanction is more precise, more diverse, and more tailored
to the facts of the case than an adverse inference instruction.7' The scalpel-like
specificity of discovery sanctions is perhaps their greatest boon because, as one
court warned:
While we eschew the imposition of rigid guidelines for the trial
courts in this circumstance-specific area of the law, the judge
should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse
nor to wield a cardboard sword if a dragon looms. Whether de-
terrence or compensation is the goal, the punishment should be
reasonably suited to the crime. 72
In tailoring such a sanction, some courts have suggested selecting the
sanction that would best
serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales under-
lying the spoliation doctrine. [By] (1) deter[ring] parties from
engaging in spoliation; (2) plac[ing] the risk of an erroneous
judgment on the party who has wrongfully created the risk; and
(3) restor[ing] "the prejudiced party to the same position he
would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence
by the opposing party. 73
These sanctions may be imposed against parties to a lawsuit that violate the ap-
propriate rules of discovery, or may even be imposed through the "inherent
power" of the court itself.74 Basically, because the court "must structure its pro-
ceedings for the most effective ascertainment of the truth, 75 it can punish any
sort of spoliation, taking place at any time, as long as the court finds that such
spoliation was intended to hinder justice.76 Many sanctions are available, includ-
71 See Judge, supra note 5, at 445-46.
72 Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990).
73 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Kron-
isch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
74 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 649 (citing Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 507 N.W.2d
527, 533 (N.D. 1993)).
75 Judge, supra note 5, at 446 (citing FED. R. EVID. 611).
76 Id. at 446-47 (citing Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 268-69 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that sanctions are appropriate, regardless of the presence of a court order, if
those imposed are similar to those found in Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE); lain D. Johnston, Federal Courts' Authority to Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation
or Pre-order Spoliation of Evidence, 156 F.R.D. 313, 318 n.39 (1994) (collecting cases)).
430 [Vol. 104
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ing "exclusion of critical testimony, monetary sanctions, 7 or even [] default
judgment ... or dismissal of the suit. '78 Courts have typically held that, in im-
posing such sanctions, they should use the least restrictive sanction deemed nec-
essary to remedy the problem.79 West Virginia's list of discovery sanctions is
extensive, including, but not limited to, the following: undisclosed matters may
be taken as established, uncooperative parties might not be permitted to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses, uncooperative parties might be prohib-
ited from introducing designated matters as evidence, part or all of the pleadings
may be stricken, the proceedings may be stayed until the discovery order is
obeyed, the claim may be dismissed or a default judgment entered, and expenses
caused by failure to cooperate will be charged to the disobedient party.80
A major problem with discovery sanctions is that such sanctions can
only be imposed for direct violations of a court order or discovery request.8' To
combat pretrial spoliation, courts have begun to impose similar sanctions spring-
ing from the inherent power of the courts themselves, in many cases not even
requiring bad faith or intent on the part of the spoliator.82 The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has set forth a list of factors to be considered in de-
77 Such sanctions may include lawyer's fees, fines, and punitive damages. See, e.g., Kawa-
mata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d 1055 (Haw. 1997) (1.5 million dollar punitive
sanction and attorney's fees awarded when a party intentionally withheld documents and in-
formation); Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994) (punitive damages
awarded when doctor spoliated medical records); Med. Billing, Inc. v. Med. Mgmt. Scis., Inc.,
169 F.R.D. 325, 327-33 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (sanctioning attorney for participating in destruction
of evidence).
78 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 649. One court has held that "dismissal is a sanction of last
resort that should only be imposed if the court concludes the parties' failure to cooperate in
discovery was willful, in bad faith, or due to its own fault." KOESEL, supra note 9, at 31 (citing
Beil v. Lakewook Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994)). Default judgements
have been held to be at the same level of severity. In In re Marriage of Lai, 625 N.E.2d 330 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993), the court held that "default judgment is the most severe sanction a court can
impose on a defendant and is proper only in those cases where actions of a party showed delib-
erate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of a court's authority." Id. at 334.
79 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 106 (D. Colo.
1996) (stating that the job of courts is to "select the least onerous sanction corresponding to the
willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice suffered by the victim"); Patton v. Newmar
Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 538 N.W.2d 116, 120
(Minn. 1995); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Maytag, Inc., 650 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994).
80 See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 37(b). These rules are to be "construed liberally to promote
justice." Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104, 114 (W. Va. 1996).
81 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 649.
82 Id. (citing Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 118; Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 507 N.W.2d
527, 535 (N.D. 1993)). The United States Supreme Court has warned that this inherent power
should be used with restraint, "[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic
controls." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
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ciding which sanction should be imposed in an instance when spoliation has
occurred, consisting of: 1) the party's degree of control, ownership, possession
or authority over the destroyed evidence; 2) the amount of prejudice suffered by
the opposing party as a result of the missing or destroyed evidence and whether
such prejudice was substantial; 3) the reasonableness of anticipating that the
evidence would be needed for litigation; and 4) if the party controlled, owned,
possessed or had authority over the evidence, the party's degree of fault83 in
causing the destruction of the evidence.84 Because of such broad discretion on
the part of courts, such sanctions have evolved into a more effective means of
combating spoliation of evidence.
C. Criminal Sanctions
Another remedy that may persuade potential spoliators to act otherwise
is the fact that many jurisdictions have obstruction of justice statutes that cover
spoliation of evidence. 85 In order for the statutes to apply, some courts require
specific intent to obstruct, while others require only a showing that justice was
likely to be obstructed.86 However, the act of destruction itself is often enough
to establish specific intent.87
This remedy is far from perfect, however. As one commentator has
stated, criminal sanctions "cannot restore the accuracy of the original fact-
finding proceeding, nor do they compensate the victim of evidence destruction
for its loss in the civil suit., 88 A judicial proceeding must be "pending ' 89 before
the statute can be violated.90 Moreover, prosecutors seem unlikely to pursue an
83 Degree of fault meaning whether or not the spoliation was intentional or negligent.
84 See Tracy v. Cottrell ex. rel. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 890 (W. Va. 1999). Other courts
have also considered factors such as: the degree of interference with the judicial process;
whether lesser sanctions will remedy any harm and deter future acts of spoliation; whether
evidence has been irretrievably lost; and whether sanctions will unfairly punish a party for
misconduct by the lawyer. See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 32-33 and accompanying notes.
85 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 650 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2809 (2001); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 135 (1985); and MINN. STAT. § 609.63(7) (1987)).
86 See Thompson, supra note 12, at 567 (citing Solum & Marzen, supra note 1, at 1113
(noting that the distinction is probably immaterial)).
87 See id.
8 GORELICK, supra note 64, § 5.13, at 198.
89 This term has been considered broadly. In the criminal context, for instance, courts have
considered a proceeding "pending" even prior to the issuing of a subpoena. See Thompson,
supra note 12, at 567 (citing United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978); United States v. Solow, 138 F.
Supp. 812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)).
90 Some jurisdictions have removed this requirement, thus punishing those who would
spoliate evidence for even a potential proceeding. See GORELICK, supra note 64, at 189-93
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obstruction charge for spoliation in the civil context.9' This is likely a result of
the fact that "[s]carce prosecutorial resources simply do not permit prosecution
of spoliation in private lawsuits. ' 92 In addition, criminal penalties for spoliation
may be useless in civil proceedings, depending upon the wording of the statute
in a particular jurisdiction.93 Finally, because many jurisdictions classify the
obstruction of justice statute as a misdemeanor,94 many spoliators who have
large sums of money at stake in such suits are willing to take the risk of having
to pay a small fine or do a small amount of time in order to protect their fi-
nances.95 In short, obstruction of justice statutes have their faults in combating
spoliation of evidence.
D. Attorney Discipline
Aside from all of the court measures that laypersons may face, attorneys
face the possibility of professional discipline should they choose to participate
in, or advise their clients to commit, spoliation of evidence.96 The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct account for such malefic behavior,97 and many states
have adopted similar rules in their attorney rules of conduct.98 Actually, this is a
"double whammy" for attorneys because not only may they face suspension,
(surveying state statutes).
91 See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled by
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) ("We know of no
reported prosecution under [California Penal Code] section 135--adopted in 1872 . . . for de-
stroying or concealing documentary evidence relevant only to prospective civil action"). How-
ever, such a prosecution has occurred in at least one jurisdiction. See United States v. Lundwall,
1 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that civil discovery remedies might, at times, be
insufficient and that the federal obstruction of justice statute was applicable, regardless of the
fact that it had never previously been used in a civil destruction of evidence context).
92 GORELICK, supra note 64, at 198.
93 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 69 (citing GORELICK, supra note 64, at 198).
94 See Thompson, supra note 12, at 570 (noting that seventeen states and the Model Penal
Code all have misdemeanor obstruction of justice statutes, most of these statutes are treated as
misdemeanors across the board).
95 See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835 ("If crucial evidence could be inten-
tionally destroyed by a party to a civil action who thereby stands to gain substantially monetar-
ily by such destruction, the effect of a misdemeanor would be of minimal deterrence.").
96 See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
437 (Minn. 1990).
97 "[An attorney shall not 'unlaw-fully [sic] obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or[ ]conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act."' Wilhoit, supra
note 4, at 651 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (1993)).
98 See, e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d at 437.
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fines, or worse from their state bar associations for such conduct, but, should
their client's case be dismissed as a result of spoliation, attorneys may face mal-
practice charges brought on by disgruntled clients. 99 Attorney sanctions and
potential malpractice claims should prove to be quite powerful deterrents, and
any attorney who chooses to participate in, or recommend, spoliation of evi-
dence is an unwise attorney, to say the least.
IV. VARIATIONS ON THE TORT
Failure to subdivide the tort of spoliation of evidence brings about con-
fusion and ignores the differences between the variations, especially when con-
sidering the usefulness of the alternative remedies discussed in Part 1I.100 There
are four possible variations of the tort of spoliation of evidence: 10 1 (1) where
"one of the parties to the litigation intentionally spoliates evidence; (2) a disin-
terested third party intentionally spoliates evidence; (3) one of the parties to the
litigation negligently spoliates evidence; and (4) a disinterested third party neg-
ligently spoliates evidence."'102 Some courts have analyzed the viability of a spo-
liation tort under the auspices of one blanket tort, and others have split the tort
into intentional and negligent versions.
103
A. Intentional Spoliation by an Adverse Party
An independent cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence by
a party to the lawsuit seems to be one of the least valid variations, as far as its
necessity in light of alternate remedies. °4 The full gamut of court remedies is
available in such an instance. The court may allow a jury to draw an adverse
inference; it may impose whatever discovery sanctions it deems fit; 105 obstruc-
99 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 651-52.
100 See Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 881 P.2d 304, 313 (Alaska 1994) (failing to adopt a
tort for negligent spoliation because a presumption against the spoliator should suffice to re-
dress it); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189-90 (N.M. 1995); (holding that a
negligent spoliation tort was unnecessary because sanctions and inferences would suffice to
redress negligent spoliation); Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 661-62 (citing St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., v.
Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); (adopting the generic tort for spoliation
of evidence)).
101 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 634.
102 Id. For an analysis of each of the four variations when considered in light of the three
fundamentals of tort law - morality, compensation, and deterrence - see id. at 663-73 &
nn.210-38.
103 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 661-62.
104 For a list of the generally agreed-upon elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, see
supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
105 For instances in which these first two remedies may be implemented, see Wilhoit, supra
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tion of justice statutes may be enforced;' °6 and attorneys found to have been a
party to spoliation may be sanctioned. 10 7 The availability of such varied meas-
ures, combined with the vast discretion available to courts in applying them,
suggests that courts may adequately deter such behavior by litigants, as well as
compensate those harmed by the spoliation. 08 The tort seems unnecessary in
situations of intentional spoliation by a party to the suit.
B. Intentional Spoliation by a Third Party
Instances of intentional spoliation of evidence, when perpetrated by a
disinterested third party, seem to present nearly the opposite side of the spec-
trum as a situation where a party to the suit intentionally spoliates. Spoliation
inferences and discovery sanctions pose no threat to a party uninvolved in the
litigation.' °9 Obstruction of justice charges, though still an option, are unlikely
to be brought, at least in civil litigation,110 and although instigating attorneys
may be sanctioned, spoliating third party clients are still not likely to receive
punishment. Even if obstruction of justice charges were to be brought, the penal-
ties for violation are usually slight, so the deterrence factor would be low."'
Also, the victim of the spoliation would likely remain uncompensated, as he
would likely lose the suit as a result.1 2 It should be noted that the Temple court
found the possibility of valuable evidence winding up in the hands of a party
with independent motivation to destroy evidence in the litigation between the
adverse parties in any given suit to be highly unlikely.113 However, the dissent
correctly points out that, for example, indemnitors of a plaintiff or defendant in
a matter may have economic incentive to destroy such evidence on the grounds
that, should the lawsuit go against the party with whom they are associated, they
may be held liable to that party for any such damages the court may award the
note 4, at 664-65.
106 Again, admittedly, such charges are highly unlikely to be brought in a civil suit. See
supra note 88.
107 See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
437 (Minn. 1990).
108 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 358-59.
109 "[T]raditional procedural ... remedies are flawed by their limited scope, their inadequate
preventive effect, and their failure to provide the victim with just compensation." Steffen Nolte,
The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 355
(1995).
It0 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
III See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 668.
112 See id.
113 See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999).
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adverse party resulting from such evidence.' 14 Because of these concerns, some
courts have adopted the tort against these third parties who destroy evidence,
and with good cause.' 15 Of all variations of the spoliation tort, intentional spolia-
tion by a third party is the most justified.
C. Negligent Spoliation by an Adverse Party
The situation of negligent spoliation of evidence by an adverse party
can be examined in much the same way as that of intentional spoliation by an
adverse party, at least as far as alternate remedies are concerned."16 The main
difference between the two becomes apparent when considering that some
courts have argued that "spoliation of evidence through negligence or inadver-
tence does not warrant as severe moral judgment against the spoliator as inten-
tional spoliation. 'l 7 Even though the same remedies are available to courts,
there is a possibility that, because of the lack of intent, and thus a perceived re-
duction in the level of culpability, courts may be less stringent in applying such
remedies. ' 8 However, implementing a claim in tort for such actions may not
help in stopping negligent spoliatory behavior, as scholars have noted that "tort
liability for negligent acts adds little to deterrence because most individuals are
rarely involved in tortious situations and, therefore, have little incentive to learn
how to avoid tortious behavior."'"19 Therefore, the best solution may be for
courts to be equally aggressive in applying remedies for negligent spoliation as
they would be when intentional spoliation is involved.
114 See id. at 240.
"15 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (while
limiting California's claim of intentional spoliation against an adverse party, the court declined
to decide on striking such a cause of action against third parties); Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189;
Rubin, supra note I, at 359 (citing Holmes, 710 A.2d at 848; Callahan, 703 A.2d at 1017 (stat-
ing that the recognition of the tort would signal 'acceptable societal behavior')).
116 See supra Part IV.A.
17 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 669 (citing as an example Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d
116, 119 (Minn. 1995)). It should be noted, however, that even this basic argument has been
rejected by some courts which choose not to differentiate between negligent and intentional
spoliation. See Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., 645 N.E.2d 964, 968 (I11. App. Ct.
1994) ("[Wlhen crucial evidence is destroyed, the offending party's intent becomes signifi-
cantly less germane in determining a proper sanction .. "); Hamann v. Ridge Tool Co., 539
N.W.2d 753, 756-57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) ("Whether the evidence was destroyed or lost acci-
dentally or in bad faith is irrelevant, because the opposing party suffered the same prejudice;
specifically, defendant was unable to challenge the evidence or respond to it....
118 For instance, in a situation in which court-imposed sanctions would be appropriate as a
result of negligent spoliation, a court might opt to exclude certain pieces of evidence as op-
posed to dismissing the case outright.
119 Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 669 (citing RICHARD L. ABEL, TORTS, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 326, 340 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990)).
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D. Negligent Spoliation by a Third Party
The court seems to be just as powerless in using discovery sanctions, or
other internal corrective remedies, to punish instances of negligent spoliation by
a third party as it is to punish intentional spoliation by a third party.'2 0 Even
remedies that the court system still might be able to enforce, such as obstruction
of justice charges, are less likely to be brought in instances of negligent spolia-
tion than in instances of intentional spoliation, as a result of the aforementioned
perception of less culpability and intent in negligent actions than in intentional
ones. 2 In a strictly comparative analysis of remedies, without taking policy
considerations into account, a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evi-
dence by a third party seems to be the best option.'
2 2
V. RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS AND WEST
VIRGINIA CASE LAW
The analysis of the four variations of the spoliation tort found in Part IV
of the note may provide some guidance, but a final judgment as to the appropri-
ateness of each potential claim cannot be made without considering the over-
arching concerns of public policy, as well as analyzing West Virginia case law,
to see if any form of the tort appears more savory than the rest.
A. Policy Concerns
1. Integrity of the Judicial System
A policy concern that warrants adoption of all variations of the tort is
that spoliation of evidence threatens the integrity of our judicial system. 23 Re-
gardless of a party's affiliation to the suit, he or she should not be able to get
away with, let alone benefit from, such behavior. 124 However, allowing a cause
of action in tort for such violations brings about "the risk of inconsistent results
or double recovery."' 25 For instance, in third party spoliation claims, it is possi-
ble that both of the adverse parties might assert that the evidence was favorable
to their case, both might sue the guilty third party, both might win, and thus gain
120 See supra Part IV.B.
121 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
122 For examples of policy considerations that swing the pendulum back towards non-adoption,
see supra Part V.A.
123 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 364.
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inconsistent verdicts. 126 Because of these difficult issues, proponents of both
sides of the spoliation debate may rely on the integrity of the judicial system to
support their cause.
2. Deterrence
As mentioned, deterrence of spoliation of evidence is an important pol-
icy goal. 127 This policy concern begs the adoption of the tort in instances of third
party spoliation, where many of the court-imposed remedies are largely unavail-
able, or often go unenforced, as with obstruction of justice statutes. 12 8 Addition-
ally, the possibility of punitive damages being recovered adds to the efficiency
of deterrence under any variation of the tort because, should the evidence be
particularly incriminating, a party might otherwise destroy evidence under the
logic that he has nothing to lose. 129 The possibility of punitive damages may
curb such temptation.
3. Compensation
Another previously-mentioned policy concern that mandates the adop-
tion of the tort in third party situations is that of compensation. 30 Although
suitably efficient in cases where the spoliator is a party to the suit, court-
imposed remedies are, again, found lacking in compensating the injured party
when a third party spoliates. The victim of the spoliation will likely lose the suit
without the evidence, and the court is unlikely to impose summary judgment, or
other sanctions or remedies, against a party to the suit who has done no
wrong.13 This may be prevented in instances where an agency, or other similar,
relationship is shown between a party to the suit and the accused spoliator.,
32
Because of this conundrum, a spoliation tort against third parties may be the
126 See Judge, supra note 5, at 460 (citing Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d
223, 231 (Cal. 1999).).
127 See supra notes 111, 119 and accompanying text.
128 See Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that
"traditional remedies would be unavailing, since the spoliator is not a party to the underlying
litigation"); Rubin, supra note 1, at 365 (citing Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846,
849 (D.C. 1998) (stating that when the spoliator is a third party, "an adverse inference against
the spoliator would serve no purpose.")).
129 See Judge, supra note 5, at 449 (citing Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent
Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator's Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1010-11 (1998).
130 See supra note 18.
131 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 667, 668.
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only way to achieve compensation for the injured party.
133
However, in regard to the compensation argument for adoption of the
tort against third parties, it is worth noting that courts have been willing to place
the burden of preservation squarely on the party to the suit in instances where
that party entrusts evidence to his agents, experts, insurers, lawyers, etc., and
such evidence is subsequently spoliated.134 This somewhat harsh argument has
been set forth by one court as follows:
[The plaintiff] knew that the [evidence] was relevant to his
claims against [the defendants] and he, therefore, had a duty to
preserve the evidence. His argument that only [plaintiff s agent]
had a duty to preserve the [evidence] is misguided. [The agent]
did not enter the suit as a party until almost a year after [the
plaintiff] filed his complaint. Moreover, that [the agent] may
also have had a duty to preserve the evidence did not absolve
[the plaintiff] of his duty to preserve evidence that was relevant
to his own claims against [the defendant]. 135
Such decisions seem to suggest that those who "own" the claim are ul-
timately responsible for keeping track of important evidence supporting such a
claim. 36 Alternate solutions to this difficult situation that have been suggested
include some form of malpractice tort for expert witnesses who damage evi-
dence, as well as some combination of certification and contract law, where
litigants could buy insurance to have a previously specified sum paid as liqui-
dated damages should vital evidence be destroyed or lost.1 37 Also, this poten-
tially harsh solution may be allayed somewhat should a court find that, under the
laws of agency or bailment, an agent or bailee bore a duty to preserve evidence
for his respective principal or bailor. In such an instance, a court could poten-
tially make the agent or bailee liable to the principal or bailor.1
38
133 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 366.
134 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 12.
135 Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., Inc., No. 97-5089, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2739 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998).
136 A claim or cause of action is typically viewed as a type of personal property. 63C AM.
JUR. 2D Property § 22 (1997).
137 Judge, supra note 5, at 459 n. 132.
138 See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of when a court may find
a duty to preserve. Bailment is typically created when a "bailor" gives personal property to a
"bailee" for safekeeping. See 8A AM. JUR. 2d Bailments § 1 (1997). "[A] voluntary bailee owes
a duty of reasonable care to the bailor." See Judge, supra note 5, at 465-66 n.162 (citing 8
C.J.S. Bailments § 25 (1988)). If a bailee causes or permits the destruction or damage of the
property, or returns the property in a damaged condition, this constitutes a conversion of the
property to the bailee's own use, and a violation of the duty of reasonable care. In such in-
20021
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4. Speculation as to Fact of Damages
Another strong counterargument to compensation is the inherent diffi-
culty of proving the fact of injury in a spoliation suit. 139 If the damages them-
selves are unable to be convincingly shown, it is difficult to assert anything in
need of compensation. The fact that the evidence is missing makes it nearly im-
possible to weigh the value that such evidence would have had on the case,
which may lead to speculation. 40 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has defined injury as "invasion of any legally protected inter-
est,' 4 ' and some courts have held that a prospective civil action qualifies as
such an interest. 42 Thus, deprivation of the chance of victory itself may count as
something of value. A quote from Prosser's Handbook on the Law of Torts is
often used to support the argument to adopt the spoliation tort, especially against
third parties. 143 Dean Prosser states:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and
the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of
first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to cre-
ate a new cause of action, where none has been recognized be-
fore.... The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of
its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel
stances, the burden of showing negligence stays with the bailor, but the burden of explaining
failure on the bailee's part shifts to the bailee. See Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607
N.E.2d 944, 947 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
139 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140 See Lionberger, supra note 4, at 219.
141 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999).
142 See, e.g., Galarza v. Union Bus. Lines, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 401, 404 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Hazen
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463-64 (Alaska 1986); Button v. Drake, 195
S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1946); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 16 (Mont.
1999).Incidentally, this is the same line of reasoning that was used to prevent defendants in the
original action from being able to bring suit for spoliation. In most instances, defendants are
unable to establish loss of a potential cause of action. See KOESEL, supra note 5, at 62 (citing
Hewitt v. Allen Canning Co., 728 A.2d 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)). Apparently,
where there is an interference in a defendant's ability to defend against a potential suit, "the
rules of court provide more than sufficient remedy." Hewitt, 728 A.2d at 321-22. But see
Hazen, 718 P.2d at 464 (common law cause of action for intentional interference with a pro-
spective civil action by spoliation of evidence; prior defendant's prospective false arrest and
malicious prosecution actions are "valuable probable expectancies").
143 See Hazen, 718 P.2d at 463-64; Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct.
App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal.
1998); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy. 144
However, this reasoning is irrelevant when used to support a potential cause of
action that is already covered by an existing tort or alternate remedy, as is the
case with most of the variations of a potential spoliation tort. 45
5. Sufficiency of Current Remedies and Claims
Perhaps the strongest argument against adoption of most variations of
the spoliation tort is that there are various remedies and claims already available
that can sufficiently handle instances of spoliation of evidence. 146 First, a spolia-
tor who is party to the litigation can be foiled by the alternate remedies set forth
in Part III of this note.147 The spoliation inference, in particular, has been
deemed superior to the tort on the grounds that it is "more efficient, it avoids the
horrors of derivative litigation, and it does the best job of fairly compensating
the victimized party."'148 Also, it has even been argued that allowing causes of
action for discovery violations steps on the toes of the court because legislatures
have explicitly given judges power to handle such instances. 4 9 In addition to the
remedies set forth in Part III, an exception to the "best evidence" rule would
allow typically banned evidence into trial when the "best" evidence has been
spoliated. 50 Finally, at least one commentator has suggested a statutory remedy
that would increase the number of legislative remedies even further.' 5' However,
144 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3-4 (4th ed. 1971). The
idea of "a remedy for every wrong" stems from the Magna Carta, which curbed the unjust
practice of courts' selling writs to the highest bidder. See David Schuman, The Right to a Rem-
edy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201-02 (1992). It has been argued that this "right to a remedy" is
not without limits. See Judge, supra note 5, at 461 n.144 (citing statutes of limitations as an
example). However, a victim of spoliation can be differentiated from one whose statute of limi-
tations has expired on his potential claim. The victim of spoliation cannot necessarily be said to
have "slept on his rights."
145 See infra Part V.A.5.
146 See infra Part V.A.5.
147 See id.; supra Part III and accompanying notes.
148 Judge, supra note 5, at 464.
149 See Thompson, supra note 12, at 594.
15o See FED. R. EVID. 1004(a)(I) (exception created if evidence is lost or destroyed, as long
as not done in bad faith by the proponent). See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d
1364, 1371-72 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (acknowledging the exception and admitting secondary evidence
when the best evidence was lost or destroyed).
151 See Judge, supra note 5, at 462. Judge suggests the following statute to legislatively
clarify one's duty to preserve evidence:
(1) Individuals and corporate and political entities have an obligation reasonably
to preserve all property within their control that may be discoverable in an im-
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even lacking legislative action, the current alternatives prove sufficient in most
instances.
1 52
One final reason for not adopting the tort in situations where negligent
spoliation is asserted is that a simple negligence claim is fully capable of cover-
ing instances of negligent spoliation. This has been a primary reason upon
which several of the courts that have deigned not to adopt a tort for negligent
spoliation have relied.153 The reasoning seems to be that "[lr]ecognizing that a
negligent spoliation claim is essentially a disguised negligence claim, many
states have concluded that the damaged party can pursue their claim under a
negligence theory, and the state need not recognize a new tort. 154 Elias v. Lan-
minent or pending legal action of which they have actual knowledge. All non-
parties who possess potentially discoverable evidence must be formally served
with notice of the legal action containing a general description of the type of
evidence required to be preserved for the parties' inspection. Nonparties who
have received actual notice of imminent or pending litigation under this section
may petition the court with jurisdiction over the action for reasonable compensa-
tion for the burdens of preservation, if any, in the event that the parties cannot
otherwise agree on a defined rate.
(2) Notwithstanding section (1), individuals and corporate and political entities
who control property that may constitute evidence in a foreseeable future pro-
ceeding may have a duty to preserve potential evidence provided that the re-
questing party can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the prop-
erty owner took actions consistent with constructive knowledge of a likely pro-
ceeding involving the potential evidence.
Id. at 462-63.
152 See, e.g., Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 578 Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 2000) ("[T]he deter-
mination of whether a plaintiff is owed a duty of care by a defendant must be rendered by the
court as a matter of law.").
153 See Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 190 (N.M. 1995); Elias v. Lancaster
Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 68 (Pa. Super. 1998)); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn. 1990); (citing as example Bondu v. Gurvich,
473 So. 2d 1307, 1312-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Coley v. Arnot Ogden Mem'l Hosp., 107
A.D.2d 67, 68-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Pirocchi v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 277,
281-82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1119 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1993); Rubin, supra note 1, at 366-7 (citing Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d
267, 270 (Ill. 1995). Oddly enough, the Bondu court adopted the cause of action for negligent
spoliation under an analysis identical to that of a claim for negligence. See supra note 40. This
confusing line of reasoning may have been caused by the novelty of the case in relation to the
creation of any version of the tort, which first took place in Smith, a few months prior to the
Bondu decision. Unique (at least for semantic purposes) elements for the negligent spoliation
tort have since arisen. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
154 Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d at 436 (citing as example Pirocchi, 365 F. Supp. at
281-82; Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312-13; Coley, 107 A.D.2d at 68-69); Rubin, supra note 1, at
355 (citing Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270; Coleman, 905 P.2d at 190; Elias, 710 A.2d at 68). It
should also be noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court has recently held that, at least in in-
stances of third party spoliation, it is possible to fit a spoliation claim into the elements of the
tort of fraudulent concealment, as well. See Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, at 757-58
[Vol. 104
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caster General Hospital,155 illustrates this "disguised negligence claim" by
analyzing the attempted spoliation under the four negligence elements of duty,
breach, proximate cause, and damages, with convincing results.
5 6
Montana is one of the very few jurisdictions to acknowledge this argu-
ment and still adopt a tort for negligent spoliation of evidence.' 57 Although not
explicitly addressing the argument, the Oliver court did treat negligent spolia-
tion somewhat differently than a simple negligence claim in two respects. First,
the Oliver court lowered the traditional standard of proof required in negligence
actions from a "preponderance of the evidence" to a "significant possibility of
success."'' 58 Although the Oliver court did not justify this change with an expla-
nation, it can be inferred that the change was based on a desire to account for the
speculation inherent in any spoliation claim. The Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car
decision,159 upon which the Oliver court largely relied, used just such an argu-
ment as justification.' 60 Basically, it seems that this "down-tuning" of the burden
of proof turns a claim that would be difficult to prove, under normal circum-
stances, into one that is likely to be difficult to refute. Additionally, the more
lenient standard accomplishes nothing, because "[i]n the absence of a proven
injury, a breached duty has not 'caused' anything."'16' It seems that the Oliver
court believed that it was forced to decide between a lesser of two evils, and
opted in favor of potential victims of spoliation, rather than those accused of
such spoliation.
Second, the Oliver court adopted the following damage calculation for-
(N.J. 2001).
155 710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
156 See id. at 68-69. The plaintiff in Elias failed to convince the court of an existing duty to
preserve on the part of the defendant hospital. See id. at 69.
157 See Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 19 (Mont. 1999).
158 See id. at 21. The court continued, "a plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial and realistic
possibility of succeeding, but need not demonstrate that such success was more likely than not."
Id. (citing Holmes v. Amerex Rent-a-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 850 (D.C. 1998).
159 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. App. 1998).
160 Id. at 850 ("reasonably close causal connection" standard generally used to show proxi-
mate cause "does not adequately protect the interests of a plaintiff in a third-party spoliation
claim ... because the very purpose of an independent action for spoliation of evidence lies in
the inability of the plaintiff to prove proximate causation to the proper degree of certainty re-
quired in the underlying suit.").
161 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30 at 165 (5th
ed. 1984) ("Negligent conduct in itself is not such an interference with the interests of the world
at large that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it, except in the case of some
individual whose interests have suffered."); Judge, supra note 5, at 454 (citing Uppgren v.
Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Minn. 1969) ("[M]ere negligence 'in
the air' is not a tort and does not become actionable until the force of the wrongful conduct
impinges on a person.")).
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mula: multiply a reasonable estimation of total damages by the probability of
victory for the plaintiff had the evidence not been spoliated.162 In so holding, the
court reasoned:
[T]he interest of the plaintiff to recover the entire amount of
damages that he would have received if the underlying action
had been pursued successfully must be balanced with the de-
fendant's interest in not providing the plaintiff with a windfall.
The plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit more from the
spoliation than he would have in the underlying suit. On the
other hand, the defendant should be adequately punished for his
offending conduct and should be required to adequately com-
pensate the plaintiff for the loss of his ability to pursue the un-
derlying suit. 163
This modification, unlike "down tuning" the burden of proof, does ap-
pear fair to both parties. However, no reason exists as to why such a standard for
damages could not be adopted under a negligence claim, whenever spoliation
serves as the basis for the claim. "The amount of damages should be determined
by the trial court and the trier of fact after a full trial on the merits[,]' 64 and a
trial judge could instruct a jury to use this method of damage computation in a
negligence action, should the circumstances merit it.
In contrast, Smith v. Adkinson more effectively addressed the spoliation
issue under the confines of a negligence claim.165 The Smith court began its
analysis by stating that an "action for negligent spoliation can be stated under
existing negligence law without creating a new tort."1 66 The court then held that
in such instances a rebuttable presumption will be created in favor of the plain-
tiff, that being that the plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying action
but for the spoliation.167 The third party can overcome such a presumption by
showing that the plaintiff would not have prevailed, even had the spoliated evi-
dence been available. 68 The three additional factors that a plaintiff must show in
order to gain the benefit of this presumption are: "(1) that the defendant spolia-
tor had actual knowledge of pending or potential litigation; (2) that a duty was
162 See Oliver, 993 P.2d at 21.
163 Id. (citing Holmes, 710 A.2d at 853).
164 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (111. 1995) (citing Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d. 1312, 1324-28, 260-64 (Il1. Ct. App. 1986)).
165 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000).
166 Id. at 432 (quoting Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270).
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imposed upon the defendant through a voluntary undertaking, an agreement, or
a specific request; and (3) that the missing evidence was vital to the plaintiff's
pending or potential action."' 69 The Smith court reasoned that the use of the re-
buttable presumption created a fair balance:
[I]t neither simply condones the defendant's negligent spolia-
tion of evidence at the plaintiff's expense nor imposes an un-
duly harsh and absolute liability upon a merely negligent party.
Instead, this approach merely selects which of two parties - the
innocent or the negligent - will bear the onus of proving a fact
whose existence or nonexistence was placed in greater doubt by
the negligent party. 170
The Smith court also opted not to adopt any unusual damage calculation
formula, squarely placing the risks of the uncertainty of damages on the wrong-
doer.' 71 The court explained that damage calculation formulas that try to meas-
ure the plaintiffs probability of success were merely "too tenuous a measure to
be consistently applied and that any attempt to apply [such formulas] would
constitute pure speculation."'' 72 The court instead opted to use the same compen-
satory damages that would have been awarded in the underlying suit, with the
risks of loss shifted as explained above. 173 This seems a much better overall
remedy than that used in Oliver, as both courts attempted to resolve some of the
inherent speculation involved in spoliation, with the Smith court having been
much more successful. 74 In summation, any rationalization that justifies the
adoption of a spoliation tort in an instance where a claim for negligence would
suffice, appears, at best, to be grounded in a desire to effect burden-shifting to
spoliation defendants in a situation where either plaintiff or defendant is inher-
ently likely to be put at a distinct disadvantage. At worst, such a rationalization
seems grounded in a simple philosophical desire to see an expansion of the tort
system. The aforementioned remedies and alternative claims appear to be at
least as adequate as a tort for spoliation of evidence would be and account for all
instances of spoliation except for intentional spoliation by a third party.
169 Id. at 432.
170 Id. at 435 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988)).
171 See id. at 436.
172 Id. at 438.
173 Id. See also supra note 163.
174 It should be noted that the dissenting opinion of Smith felt that the court had, de facto,
adopted a tort for negligent spoliation, as a result of the additional elements necessary to effect
the burden shifting. Id. at 439 (See, J., dissenting). Regardless of whether the Smith court actu-
ally adopted a new cause of action in its decision, the Smith remedy is very attractive.
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6. Desire to Prevent Endless Litigation
Another policy reason that several courts have used to denigrate the
spoliation tort is the desire to prevent endless litigation. 175 The Supreme Court
of Texas refused to adopt a spoliation tort largely based on this reasoning, stat-
ing that
[w]hile the law must adjust to meet society's changing needs,
we must balance that adjustment against boundless claims in an
already crowded judicial system. We are especially averse to
creating a tort that would only lead to duplicative litigation[]
[and] encourag[e] inefficient relitigation of issues.... 176
Much of this concern stems from what courts refer to as "derivative tort" ac-
tions,177 or those premised on the idea that the conclusion of one lawsuit permits
the filing of another.1 78 Derivative tort actions are perceived as a threat to the
finality of judgments, and the limited resources of the court system strongly
favor an end to litigation.
79
Another reason given not to adopt the spoliation tort, and that can also
be reduced to the court system's desire to see an end to litigation, is that destruc-
tion of evidence is similar to perjury or embracery' 80 "in that both undermine the
integrity of a trial; yet, there are no independent torts recognized for these
crimes."18' Again, the rationale comes down to the desire to end litigation. As
one court that relied upon in the Cedars-Sinai decision aptly put it:
[W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to
meet and expose perjury then and there.... The trial is his op-
portunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails,
175 See, e.g., Temple Comm. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 233 (Cal. 1999);
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998); Trevino v. Ortega, 969
S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998).
176 Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 951.
177 Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 515.
178 Id. at 515-16.
179 See id. at 516; Judge, supra note 5, at 457.
180 "Embracery is '[t]he crime of attempting to influence a jury corruptly to one side or the
other."' Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (6th ed. 1990)).
181 Rubin, supra note 1, at 367 (citing Regal Marble, Inc., v. Drexel Invs., Inc., 568 So. 2d
1281, 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834 (Ct.
App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal.
1998)). Both Regal Marble, Inc. and Smith v. Superior Court stated that perjury is a crime
against the state, deserving of criminal prosecution rather than a civil action. Id.
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being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails
to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a
new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without
remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous
one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad
to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the
evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be
remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally
determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of
justice. 182
However, spoliation can be differentiated from both of these crimes on the
ground that it is often revealed during discovery rather than during or after the
trial.183 Therefore, there is at least an argument that a tort for spoliation might be
more justified than a tort for either of these crimes because by their very nature,
they may only happen during trial and will not be caught early enough to amend
the party's complaint. Also, false dealings such as perjury may be exposed dur-
ing cross-examination if discovered, while the spoliation victim appears without
recourse.84 The spoliation is not a false set of facts to be disproven, but rather a
nullity; it cannot be presented to the jury and plays no role whatsoever in delib-
erations.1 85 Regardless, adding this desire of courts to end litigation to the mix of
issues dogging adoption of a spoliation tort makes the tort's adoption that much
more of an uphill battle.
7. Need to Limit the Effects of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel
A policy concern tied closely to that of the desire to prevent endless liti-
gation is that adoption of such a tort might lead to violations of res judicata
186
and collateral estoppel187 when the spoliation issue has already been adjudicated
182 Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 516-17 (quoting Pico v. Cohn, 27 P. 537 (Cal. 1891)).
183 See Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 516, 520.
184 See Temple Comm. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 230 (Cal. 1999).
185 See id. at 239 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
186 Also called claim preclusion, res judicata "essentially is a finality doctrine whereby 'a
final judgment on the merits bars a second suit for the same claim by parties or their privies."'
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn.
1990) (citing Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984)).
187 "The application of collateral estoppel is appropriate where: (1) the issue was identical to
one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was
given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue." Federated Mutual Ins.
Co., 456 N.W.2d at 439.
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in the original action.' 88 Courts generally prefer to handle spoliation claims in
the original action. 89 The Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned in Boyd v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co. that
a single trier of fact may be allowed to hear an action for negli-
gent spoliation concurrently with the underlying suit on which it
is based. ... A single trier of fact would be in the best position
to resolve all the claims fairly and consistently. If a plaintiff
loses the underlying suit, only the trier of fact who heard the
case would know the real reason why.190
The Boyd court went on to explain that it would be simple to include the third
party spoliator in the underlying action by employing joinder, and finding two
closely related transactions to base such an action on: the explosion of the evi-
dence, and the subsequent loss of the evidence by the third party.' 9' The court
explained that employing joinder in this instance would "promote fairness and
consistency, while conserving valuable judicial resources. 192 Some courts,
however, have stated a second action may be appropriate in instances of spolia-
tion, either on grounds that (1) the spoliation itself is an intervening fact that
gives new grounds for the claims and defenses of the parties,' 93 or (2) that spo-
liation centers around the breach of a duty to preserve evidence, and thus differs
from the issues of the original action. 194 At least one court has settled on a mid-
dle ground: when spoliation is discovered "in time for the underlying litigation,"
it may be handled in the underlying suit by use of the spoliation inference. 95 If,
188 Rubin, supra note 1, at 367 (citing Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966
(W.D. La. 1992); Reilly PPA v. D'Errico, No. CV93 0346095S, 1994 WL 547671, at *6 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991);
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998)); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954
P.2d 511, 516 (Cal. 1998).
189 See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 62-63.
190 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., No. C6661, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10555 (N.D. I11. July 25, 1996) (negligent spoliation
claim should be tried concurrently with the original claim).
191 See Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 272-73.
192 Id. at 273. The court also explained that in this single action, the plaintiff need not show
that he would have won the case had he possessed the missing evidence, but only that he had a
reasonable probability of success in the underlying suit. Id. at 271.
193 See Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Hialeah
Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So. 2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
194 See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
438-39 (Minn. 1990).
195 See Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, 758 (N.J. 2001).
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however, it is not discovered until "after the underlying action has been lost or
otherwise seriously inhibited," then a separate cause of action in tort is appro-
priate.19 6 It seems that the best solution may be to handle the spoliation issue in
the original case, when arising prior to trial, but because doing so may cause
more severe problems concerning speculation of damages, it is arguable that it is
a viable option to handle such a claim in a second suit.
197
8. Speculation as to Amount of Damages
The debate over whether to handle spoliation issues in the original or
subsequent trial leads to a third policy concern that weighs against a spoliation
tort: the inherent speculation involved in determining the value of evidence that
no longer exists, because
it is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would
have shown. It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even pre-
suming that the destroyed evidence went against the spoliator,
to calculate what it would have contributed to the plaintiffs
success on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Given the plain-
tiff has lost the lawsuit without the spoliated evidence, it does
not follow that he would have won it with the evidence. The
lost evidence may have concerned a relevant, but relatively triv-
ial matter. If evidence would not have helped to establish plain-
tiff's case an award of damages for its destruction would work a
windfall for the plaintiff.
98
However, it appears that in instances where it is obvious that spoliation
has significantly inhibited the party's ability to recover, or significantly in-
creased chances of loss, so the fact of damages is present, but specificity of
damages is not, such speculation may be immaterial.' 99 This may be helped by
allowing the underlying claim to be litigated and then using the result to attempt
to weigh the value of the missing evidence, a practice that has been adopted by
196 See id.
197 See infra Part V.A.8.
198 Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d at 438 (quoting Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.,
501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (Iil. App. Ct. 1986)). See also Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court,
954 P.2d 511, 518 (Cal. 1998) ("Without knowing the content and weight of the spoliated evi-
dence, it would be impossible for the jury to meaningfully assess what role the missing evi-
dence would have played in the determination of the underlying action.").
199 "Juries often are asked to determine damages in wrongful death and personal injury cases
or in other actions in which the nature of the claim makes the calculation uncertain. A denial of
all recovery in such cases simply because the damages cannot be stated with certainty would
allow wrongdoers to profit from their wrongs." Thompson, supra note 12, at 589.
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some states. 200 It is possible to evaluate missing evidence using a formula such
as that adopted in Oliver.20 1 This may seem a daunting and subjective task, but
some proponents of the tort have analogized the potential action to that of legal
malpractice, which uses a similar standard.20 2 The argument for adopting the
tort, when necessary, is further aided by the possibility that the spoliation issues
litigated in the subsequent suit may not be the same as those in the original suit,
especially when the subsequent suit is against a third party.203 Situations of third
party spoliation may present no other remedy, and the United States Supreme
Court has held that when the tort itself precludes the ascertainment of damages,
"it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief
to the injured person. ' 2°4 It has also been said that such speculation may be a
part of every tort suit, which is why causation and resulting damages are an ele-
ment of every tort.20 5 However, it seems a better option to use alternative reme-
dies in adverse party claims of spoliation because, even with helpful formulas, a
calculation of the amount of damages is still somewhat subjective, and may re-
sult in windfalls for potentially injured parties.2°
9. Concern for Property Rights
A final argument that courts have recognized in opposition to adoption
of an independent spoliation tort is that it could result in severe infringement of
200 See Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 434 (citing similar policies in Florida (Bondu v.
Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)) and Illinois (Fox v. Cohen, 406
N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980))). The dissenting opinion in Temple stated that resolution
of the case by settlement would be sufficient. Temple Comm. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976
P.2d 223, 238.
201 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
202 See Pati Jo Pofahl, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional Spoliation of
Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REv. 961, 975. In fact, the standard in malpractice actions is often more
stringent, requiring that "but for" the attorney's conduct, the plaintiff would have won the case.
In spoliation claims, the standard is typically that there was a "reasonable probability" that the
plaintiff would have obtained compensation "but for" the spoliation. Id. at 974-75. However,
legal malpractice actions are easier to prove than spoliation actions. In malpractice suits, plain-
tiffs only need to establish the proper standard of care for the reasonable attorney. This is not
hard to accomplish, as the plaintiff only need gain access to one of the vast array of legal expert
witnesses in circulation. Expert testimony on missing evidence, however, would be nearly
worthless, because "each piece of evidence is necessarily unique, and there is unlikely to be any
mechanism that enables an expert to testify about the value of evidence he has never examined,
much less what effect that evidence would have had on the outcome of the plaintiffs particular
claim." Judge, supra note 5, at 456.
203 See, e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 456 N.W.2d at 438-39.
204 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
205 See Temple, 976 P.2d at 239 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
206 See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 519 (Cal. 1998).
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private property rights.2 °7 One extreme result could be that fear of liability for
spoliation might prevent individuals from destroying property that presents a
health or safety risk.20 8 Another might be that people would be forced to stock-
pile junk out of fear that a piece of it might turn out to be evidence needed for
trial, thus subjecting the person to claims in tort.209 This is exemplified by the
fact that many corporations have routine document destruction programs that
might come into direct conflict with such a tort, if not implemented correctly.
210
Such cost arguments have been criticized by at least one critic as being exces-
sive, asserting that costs to preserve evidence should be minimal, and should
they prove otherwise, the court may order the evidence into the custody of the
affected party and charge them with the costs of preservation. 21 Also, this prob-
lem is reduced somewhat by the need for a duty to preserve in negligent, as well
207 Rubin, supra note 1, at 368 (citing Walsh v. Caidin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327 (Ct. App.
1991) (holding that a widow had the sole authority over the disposition of the decedent's re-
mains and did not owe a duty to the appellants to preserve the "evidence" because "the law
does not treat a human dead body as merely another form of physical evidence"); Koplin v.
Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (recognizing that the limitless
scope of an independent spoliation tort would cause "the unwarranted intrusion on the property
rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own property"); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder
Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. La. 1992) (recognizing that "courts must also be concerned
with interference with a person's right to dispose of his own property as he chooses")).
208 See Foster v. Lawrence Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D. Kan. 1992); Edwards,
796 F. Supp. 966.
209 See Wilhoit, supra note 4, at 657 (citing County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721,
736-37 (Ct. App. 1989) (unpublished opinion) (Anderson, J., dissenting)). Judge Anderson
discussed the burden that might be imposed upon the public using car accidents as an example:
[B]ecause every accident causing personal injury and/or property damage
involves the probability of a lawsuit, including numerous foreseeable and
unforeseeable defendants, the owner of all wrecked cars will now be forced
to store the wreck (or drive the partially damaged car without repair) for an
indefinite period of time. The absurdity of this scenario is self-evident con-
sidering the logistical problems of keeping track of tens of thousands of
piled up vehicles, the vast expense of storage fees, the hardship worked
upon the owners and their family by not being able to get reimbursement for
their damaged cars, and the safety problems created by driving unrepaired,
inherently dangerous automobiles on the public roadways. What little land-
scape our ever encroaching 'civilization' has left will hence forward be
transformed into one giant junk yard.
Id. at 736-27.
210 For good discussions of how corporations may continue such policies while simultane-
ously avoiding spoliation issues, see Steven W. Huang & Robert H. Muriel, Spoliation of Evi-
dence: Defining the Ethical Boundaries of Destroying Evidence, 22 AM. J. 191 (1998) and
Jeffrey Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver, Demystifying Spoliation of Evidence, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 761 (1999).
211 See Pofahl, supra note 202, at 973.
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as intentional, instances of spoliation.21 2 It is apparent that this property argu-
ment appears somewhat weaker in comparison with other arguments against
adoption of the tort, such as the sufficiency of existing remedies and speculation
as to the amount of damages.
B. West Virginia Statutory and Case Law
West Virginia has repeatedly declined to address the issue of an inde-
pendent spoliation tort,213 and has tended to rely on alternative remedies when
available. 1 However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated
that "it appears there may be a valid cause of actionfor spoliation of evidence in
appropriate cases[,] ' '215 and it appears that the court may have decided to agree
with other jurisdictions on what the elements of such a cause of action would
212 See Rubin, supra note 1, at 356-57 (noting the parallel elements of negligent and inten-
tional spoliation in the states where the tort has been adopted, and that "courts have held that
even the intentional spoliation tort requires that a defendant owe some duty to a plaintiff to
preserve the evidence before a defendant can be held liable[,]" and citing Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987); Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana
Law on Spoliation of Evidence-Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Cor-
rectly?, 58 LA. L. REV. 837, 849 (1998)). Such a duty may arise from various sources, includ-
ing contracts, statutes or regulations, bailments, document retention policies, or ethical duties
(in the case of attorneys). See KOESEL, supra note 9, at 8-9; Judge, supra note 5, at 465-66.
Duty has also been assigned to a party through actual or constructive notice on a pending suit.
See Judge, supra note 5, at 451-53. In deciding whether to impose constructive notice of a
pending suit upon a party, one court considered such factors as "(1) the sheer magnitude of the
losses; (2) that [the party] attempted to document the damage through photographs and reports;
and (3) that it immediately brought in counsel as well as experts to assess the damage and at-
tempt to ascertain its likely causes in anticipation of litigation." Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America v. Liebert Corp., No. 96 CIV. 6675(DC), 1998 WL 363834, at *4, n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June
29, 1998).
213 See Tracy v. Cottrell ex. rel. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 888 (W. Va. 1999) (declining to
decide on the issue because the court had not been asked and citing precedent of indecision in
State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994)); Harrison
v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104, 117 (W. Va. 1996 ("We again decline to resolve the viability of such
a cause of action because we find the circuit court properly dismissed the plaintiff's spoliation
of evidence claim as untimely filed."); Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.E.2d 270, 271 (W. Va.
1991) (expressing no view on the merits of a cause of action for intentional or negligent spolia-
tion of evidence).
214 Brady v. Deals On Wheels, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 457, 466 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a spoliation inference would have been appropriate in this case); Tracy,
524 S.E.2d at 887, 890; Adkins v. K-Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840, 847 (W. Va. 1998); (stating a
determination of proper sanctions was inappropriate as the alleged spoliator was not a party to
the lawsuit); Chambers v. Spruce Lighting Co., 95 S.E. 192 (W. Va. 1918) (stating failure to
produce a document raises the presumption that it would not support his position, and that new
trials may be necessary as a result of such conduct). See also W.V. R. Civ. P. 37(b) for the list
of discovery sanctions available to the court.
215 Adkins, 511 S.E.2d at 848.
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include, should it ever decide to adopt one.2t6 Although West Virginia has
avoided the issue of whether to adopt a spoliation tort, it has addressed two
situations that might be analogous to the tort and that might shed some light on
whether, and to what extent, to adopt the tort.
2 17
The first of these situations concerned whether to allow recovery of
economic damages as a result of an interruption in commerce caused by negli-
gent injury to the property of a third person, absent privity of contract or some
other special relationship with the alleged tortfeasor.21 8 The Aikens court de-
clined to adopt such a claim, basing its decision largely upon the requirement for
some duty to the plaintiff, as well as foreseeability of the injury on the part of
the alleged tortfeasor.2'9 The case can be analogized to the spoliation issue by
considering that West Virginia would require a violation of a duty to preserve
before it would allow a spoliation claim to be given merit.220 However, the Aik-
ens court explicitly held that its decision applied strictly to situations of "eco-
nomic loss from an interruption in commerce caused by another's negligence[,]"
so, implicitly, the court might not expand its views to include spoliation is-
sues.
22'
The Aikens court elaborated somewhat on the idea of a "special rela-
tionship" existing between parties when considering an assignment of duty to a
party. 222 The court stated that such a relationship, which would include instances
of privity of contract, would be required whenever damages are solely economic
in nature.223 The court deigned not to give a comprehensive list of situations
when a special relationship might arise, but did provide the following guideline:
The existence of a special relationship will be determined
largely by the extent to which the particular plaintiff is affected
differently from society in general. It may be evident from the
216 Harrison, 478 S.E.2d at 117 (agreeing with the elements set forth in Foster v. Lawrence
Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Kan. 1992)).
217 See infra notes 218-32 and accompanying text;
218 Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000). For more on the court's assessment of
the role of a "special relationship" between parties in assigning duty, see infra notes 222-24 and
accompanying text.
219 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 579. For more on the foreseeability issue in the court's assessment
of an assignment of duty, see infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
221 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 591. The court further stated that this opinion did not "encompass,
and has no effect upon, our prior rulings regarding medical monitoring, negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases, or nuisance law." Id.
222 See id. at 590.
223 See id. It would seem that such an instance will typically be the situation in spoliation
cases, at least in the civil context.
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defendant's knowledge or specific reason to know of the poten-
tial consequences of the wrongdoing, the persons likely to be
injured, and the damages likely to be suffered.224
It is likely that a similar assessment might be used in determining a duty to pre-
serve evidence under a potential spoliation claim.
In its discussion on foreseeability, the Aikens court stated that "[t]he ul-
timate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability
that harm may result if it is not exercised., 225 In other cases, the court has sug-
gested, in accordance with some jurisdictions,226 that such a duty might exist in
potential instances of third party spoliation.227 It appears that the Adkins court
would have addressed the validity of a spoliation claim, were it not for the fact
that the accused spoliator was a third party to the action.228 The court did seem
to implicitly suggest that at least certain forms of third party spoliation might
justify an independent cause of action when such foreseeability imposes a
duty.
The second potentially analogous situation involved whether to allow a
claim for anticipated medical monitoring costs when plaintiffs had been tor-
tiously exposed to toxic substances, but were not yet exhibiting signs of ill-
ness.230 In Bower, this claim was held to exist in West Virginia, but with the
caveat that the plaintiff must prove "with reasonable certainty that such costs
would be incurred as a proximate consequence of a defendant's tortious con-
duct.",23' To analogize this, West Virginia might require that plaintiffs prove to a
224 Id. at 589.
225 Id. at 578 Syl. Pt. 8 (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82 (1988)). Other
courts have used this same foreseeability test when imposing a duty in negligent third party
spoliation cases. See Kalumetals, Inc. v. Hitachi Magnetics Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520
(W.D. Pa. 1998); Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Shaffer v. RWP
Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Moyers ex rel. Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941
F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa.
1994); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874 (1985); (recognizing a
claim for negligent third party spoliation, but only when the party accused should have rea-
sonably foreseen that destruction of the evidence could lessen the plaintiff's chances of success
in a prospective or pending action and where the actions were reasonable); Boyd v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (11. 1995) ("[A] defendant owes a duty of due care to preserve
evidence if a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have foreseen that the evi-
dence was material to a potential civil action.").
226 See supra note 217.
227 See Adkins v. K-Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840, 848 (W. Va. 1998).
228 See id.
229 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
230 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
231 Id. at 430. Unlike the potential spoliation tort, however, this cause of action was approved
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reasonable certainty that they would have won the case, if not for the spoliation.
This would prove to be quite difficult to do without the evidence available, and




When the issue does finally come before the court, West Virginia
should adopt a tort for spoliation of evidence only in the most necessitous of
circumstances. West Virginia has skirted the issue consistently to date, and there
are a multitude of alternate remedies available and policy concerns that would
seem to oppose such a tort's adoption. The alternate remedies, if enforced vig-
orously, preclude the need for such a tort where the alleged spoliator is a party
to the existing suit. West Virginia can avoid adoption of the negligent version of
the tort, should it so choose, by following those jurisdictions that have held the
claim to be fully encompassed within a general negligence claim. The method-
ology used by the court in Smith v. Atkinson seems quite sound and the best op-
tion, regardless of whether one chooses to call its end result a modified negli-
gence claim or an independent tort for negligent spoliation of evidence by a
third party. The court should be particularly narrow, and adopt a spoliation tort
only in instances of third party intentional spoliation, as recommended by the
dissenters in Temple, where it seems mandated by policy concerns, and where
there is no other remedy available to an injured party. However, should the court
opt for uniformity by adopting the tort for all third party spoliators, it could just
as easily adopt the Smith v. Atkinson standard as an independent tort for negli-
gent spoliation by a third party, and merely add the element of intent for inten-
tional spoliation by a third party.
Sean R. Levine*
based largely because of health concerns, after plaintiffs had proven that they had been exposed
to toxic substances. Id. at 431.
232 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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